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Abstract: This paper examines the dynamics of regional integration and economic 
convergence in the post-Soviet world during the period 1999-2008. This is the period, when 
FSU countries experienced rapid economic growth, following the “Big Bang” of the 
disintegration of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and the deep economic recession of the 
1990s. It starts by discussing a set of indicators reflecting various aspects of interaction of 
post-Soviet countries (trade, labor migration, integration in key functional markets and 
economic convergence in different areas) and examines the dynamics of these indicators for 
the whole region and sub-groups of countries, as well as potential causes and conclusions to 
be drawn. In addition, it looks at the clusters of regional integration and economic 
convergence using the hierarchical cluster analysis and attempts to identify the reasons for 
their formation. We find that during the period studied the trade integration experienced a 
negative trend, but at the same time we observe an unprecedented expansion of labor 
migration – thus suggesting that integration of factor flows can outperform integration of 
markets for goods and services. Finally, clustering processes of the post-Soviet states for the 
economic convergence and for the economic integration seems to be unaffected by each other. 
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1. Introduction 
 The conceptualization of the regional integration in social sciences usually refers to a 
number of different dimensions, ranging from regionalization through the interaction of 
businesses and individuals over state-promoted economic cooperation towards an increase of 
regional cohesion and convergence (Hurrell, 1995). The European integration experience 
assumes a specific sequence of these processes (if not the causal link between them) – from 
the integration of the markets of goods towards free movement and capital and labor and 
finally increasing convergence of regional economies. However, non-European regionalism 
sometimes reverses the sequence and demonstrates different combinations of the aspects of 
regionalization and regionalism. This paper aims to look at one particular case of this non-
European regional integration, studying specifically the interaction between the integration of 
markets of goods, factor movements and economic convergence, studying the experience of 
the former Soviet Union (FSU) countries.  
Studying FSU is relevant from three perspectives. First, the usual assumption of 
regionalism is that the regional integration proceeds from a relatively disjointed region 
towards a greater regional unity. It is to a certain extent true for Europe (although European 
regional awareness is much older than the Treaty of Rome), but is quite unlikely to be the 
case for other regions of the world, where “regional integration” usually masks a combination 
of “coming together” and “falling apart” processes, for example, from the old colonial 
heritage (which also established a specific pattern of regional interdependence, integration 
and even federalism) or even pre-colonial economic and political linkages. The FSU area 
seems to be a good field for analyzing these phenomena and their influence on the interaction 
of different aspects of regionalism.  
Second, the design of the international cooperation in the FSU has been, at least 
formally, heavily influenced by the European experience, and the post-Soviet regionalism 
could be perceived as an attempt to copy the EU up to the letter– a situation which seems to 
have changed only recently with the advancement of the “open regionalism” thinking in the 
policy debate on the FSU integration (Kosikova, 2010). Hence, it is also interesting to look at 
the differences between the impact of very similar formal institutions given differences in 
economic environment.  
Finally, the debate on the regional integration in the FSU as such is not trivial. The 
decrease of trade and economic activity between the former Soviet republics after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union has been neither surprising nor disputable. On the one hand, the 
disintegration of a state is deemed to create border effects between newly independent 
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countries (as documented by Djankov and Freund, 2002, for the post-Soviet world). On the 
other hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with the start of the transition to the 
market economy, which brought widespread disruption to Soviet economies because of the 
need to establish new coordination mechanisms between economic agents as old hierarchical 
planning mechanisms were abolished (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997). This problem, a major 
one for every one of the new independent states, was exacerbated by the emergence of 
borders and a lack of coordination between governments. Numerous attempts made by the 
former Soviet states to create an integrated economic area – beginning with the “Ruble zone” 
currency union of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic 
Community and the Union of Russia and Belarus – were unsuccessful during the economic 
crisis experienced by all post-Soviet countries in the 1990s (Olcott et al., 1999).  During this 
period, the post-Soviet space continued to exhibit a very strong bias towards domestic trade, 
limiting disintegration in the region (Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, 2003; Elborgh-Woytek, 2003). 
 However, following the deep transitional recession of the 1990s, in the 2000s the 
former Soviet Union (FSU) entered a period of rapid economic growth, from which almost all 
the region’s countries benefited. This growth seems to have influenced the political and 
economic relations between the FSU countries. To start with, a stronger Russian government 
has devoted increasing attention to its “closest neighbors” (as discussed in Trenin, 2004, and 
Vinokurov, 2007), resulting in a number of new integration initiatives and the re-modelling of 
old regional structures, though with mixed success. In addition, economic growth in Russia 
and in Kazakhstan appears to have created a new generation of multinationals in these 
countries whose focus is the FSU (see Libman, 2007). The new growth centers in the CIS 
triggered migration flows from less developed countries, which, unlike the old “permanent 
migration” of ethnic minorities caused by wars and conflicts, were strongly economically 
motivated and in many cases were not permanent (Korobkov, 2007). A substantial bulk of 
shared infrastructure (railroad, electricity) remains, which, together with common culture and 
language, support further integration. Furthermore, it is often claimed that regionalism 
generally has more chance of succeeding during the boom periods than during the recession, 
when the temptation of protectionism is too strong (the Western Europe experience being a 
good example of this). It has therefore proved particularly interesting to study the impact 
upon economic integration and cooperation of this “golden age” for the post-Soviet region. 
 This paper considers the dynamics of the regional integration in the post-Soviet space 
during this period, using new data provided by the Eurasian Development Bank as part of its 
EDB System of Indicators of Eurasian Integration (SIEI) project (Vinokurov, 2010). The SIEI 
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aggregates information from a variety of sources, including the CIS Interstate Statistical 
Committee and national statistical and governmental agencies. We have examined the years 
between 1999 and 2008, i.e., the period of post-crisis recovery (from its origins during the 
global crisis of 1997-1998) until the new economic decline in 2008-2009. The region’s 
economic integration is discussed on a dyadic level (looking at pairs of post-Soviet 
economies) and the regional level (for five groups of post-Soviet countries). Analyzing all 
twelve FSU countries that are not currently members of the EU (i.e., excluding Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia), we examine different facets of regional integration in the post-Soviet 
world. Integration is measured according to the relative volumes of the flows of goods and 
services across national borders in the FSU region. In addition, we will study the related issue 
of economic convergence between post-Soviet countries. 
The following section of this paper provides a short description of the institutional 
details necessary for understanding the regional integration dynamics in the FSU in the 2000s. 
The third part presents our data and methodology. The fourth part outlines the key outcomes 
of our analysis at regional level. We then consider the key outcomes of dyadic integration 
across the region’s twelve countries. The final part of the paper presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Post-Soviet regionalism and regionalization 
 The development of the regionalism projects in the former Soviet Union started almost 
simultaneously with the collapse of the USSR. Hence, from the very beginning the regional 
integration in the FSU appeared as a combination of two distinct approaches. On the one 
hand, the “civilized divorce” logic dictated the use of the regional institutions to mitigate 
conflicts inevitably arising between the new independent states and to reduce the costs of the 
dissolution of the existing economic linkages. On the other hand, the regional projects in the 
FSU have been relatively often considered as a way to support a “new” form of regional 
integration in the FSU, which has been usually modeled from the example of the European 
Union. During the last two decades there have been several attempts to construct a regional 
integration agreement in this area – usually very similar in terms of aims and scope, but 
different in terms of membership. Usually the proliferation of the agreements was explained 
by the need of a “multi-speed” integration with an advanced “core”; however, so far search 
for the core has been almost unsuccessful. 
 Basically, three regional agreements should be mentioned: the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and the Union State of 
Russia and Belarus. The first encompasses all former Soviet republics subject to this study 
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and was established in 1991. The CIS exhibits a sophisticated and complex decision-making 
structure, including a total of 87 institutions, mostly engaged in sector-specific cooperation 
and coordination. Some of them directly parallel the European experience (the Eurasian 
Community of Coal and Steel). In the early 1994 the CIS free trade area, customs union, 
payment union and economic union treaties were signed, yet not implemented. The Eurasian 
Economic Community came into existence in the mid-1990s as a union of Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan, yet gradually grew to include several new members (Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan, as well as in 2006-2008 Uzbekistan). The objectives of the group are very similar 
to the original agenda of the CIS (which slowly moves towards a stronger orientation on 
humanitarian and social issues, as well as sector-specific coordination in transportation), 
however, the advancements of the group seem to be somewhat larger; at the moment it has 
established a limited free trade area. The Union State of Russia and Belarus was formed in 
1996, includes just these two countries and is probably the most ambitious project, which 
ultimately aims to create a confederation of Russia and Belarus with a common currency, 
foreign policy and citizenship. Indeed, there are only minor trade restrictions existing between 
these two countries (although both of them often use non-tariff regulations like medical 
control or restrictions on share of imported goods in domestic retail), however, policy 
coordination is underdeveloped. 
 It should be noted that there has been also a number of further integration projects in 
the FSU, which have been less institutionalized or (even) less successful (although the success 
of other projects is questionable as well). One initiative to be mentioned is the Single 
Economic Space (SES), which was agreed shortly before the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine 
and which ultimately collapsed after the power shift in this country. Originally the SES was 
designed as a more flexible economic structure without the clear “EU-like” agenda of 
integration (with supranational institutions and binding treaties); however it eventually shifted 
its agenda towards the customs union discussion. The three largest members of the SES and 
EurAsEC – Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan – can also be treated as an integration grouping 
on its own, particularly after 2010, when these countries initiated yet another customs union 
project among them. The Central Asian countries implemented a number of regional 
initiatives, which, however, never achieved even the stage of a limited free trade area. Finally, 
it is also necessary to mention the GUAM project of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and 
Moldova, which, however, still has a very limited economic agenda and is mostly devoted to 
the political issues. 
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 Overall it seems to be a consensus among the students of the FSU economic space that 
most of these projects are notorious for having fallen far short of their declared goals, even 
failing to abide by agreements and agreed roadmaps for their implementation (Kobrinskaya, 
2007). Specifically, while the goals of already the CIS included the establishment of a full-
fledge economic union, so far the region failed to set up even a free trade area; only the last 
attempt of a customs union (the 2010 project of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan – actually the 
second attempt of a customs union within this group) seems to move towards the 
implementation stage, although past experience calls for caution. It is possible, however, that 
given traditional links between companies in post-Soviet countries (Yudanov, 2000), and their 
shared infrastructure, private agents were able to overcome the shortcomings of cross-border 
cooperation. From that point of view it is also necessary to look at the informal economic and 
social ties in the FSU regions as the potential driving forces of integration even in spite of the 
low effectiveness of the formal integration agreements. The experience of regional integration 
in South-East Asia and Africa shows that informal networks of traders connected by common 
language and culture are very likely to cross the borders between countries even in a relatively 
protectionist world. In the FSU the traditional social ties, common background shared by 
entrepreneurs and managers from different countries, as well as Russian as lingua franca 
could have similar effect (Obydenkova, 2010). From that point of view a bottom-up 
integration approach in the FSU could remain interesting. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 One of the key problems for any study of post-Soviet economic integration has been 
the lack of comparative quantitative indicators of cross-border economic activity. In writing 
this paper we have benefited from the SIEI data made available only recently, which 
aggregates several key variables of our analysis. To begin with, this paper (as well as the 
SIEI) looks at the process of market integration rather than at formal cooperation between 
countries. It should be noted, nevertheless, that any rigorous analysis of market integration 
must examine price convergence in the countries of the region (O’Rourke and Williamson, 
2002). As such information is not available for the post-Soviet space, we have used trade flow 
volumes as the second best indicator (or, indeed, as an indicator of the conditions necessary 
for market integration in its strictest definition).  
 The SIEI data utilizes five indices of market integration. Two of these relate to 
“general” trade and movement and measure “total trade” integration and “labor migration” 
integration. The three other indices are measures of integration in individual areas and are of 
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greater interest, since, to our knowledge, this information has never been used before in 
empirical papers on post-Soviet integration: they take account of integration in the 
agricultural sector (trade in grain), power utilities (trade in electricity) and education (mobility 
of students). Hence, three indices (total trade, agriculture and power utilities) refer to the trade 
in goods; mobility of students can be treated both as a measure of trade in (specific) services 
and as an indicator of mobility (since studying abroad has an obvious impact on subsequent 
decisions on work location). All indices are constructed in a similar fashion: trade flow 
volumes relative to the size of the economy (measured by GDP) or population, as shown in 
Table A1 in the Appendix. The exception to this is the total trade index, which is an average 
of the indices which relate volume of inter-rational trade to total foreign trade turnover and to 
GDP. However, this exception does not appear to influence the results since both component 
indices strongly correlate (therefore total growth in trade for FSU countries appears to be 
closely related to increases in their GDP).  
 It is clear that at least one important indicator is missing from the list: there are no data 
to take into account the mobility of capital. The reason for this is that most published statistics 
on foreign direct investment (FDI) in the CIS are prohibitively poor. Data on FDI is reported 
only by individual country (the CIS Interstate Statistical Committee does not aggregate this 
information) and has numerous gaps. For countries on which data is available, enormous 
discrepancies are apparent between the data reported by the exporter and the importer for the 
same capital flow. For example, Russian investment in Kazakhstan in 2007 amounted to 
USD13.052m according to Russian statistics and USD772m according to data from 
Kazakhstan authorities. Similarly, Ukrainian data shows an investment flow from Ukraine to 
Russia of USD148.6m, versus USD23.8m according to Russian statistics. In 2008 the data of 
the Russian and Kazakhstan statistics for the investment flow from Russia to Kazakhstan was 
respectively USD 762.2m and USD9463.5m, for the investment flow from Russia to Ukraine 
Russian statistics reported USD 2397.8m and Ukrainian USD 390m! Moreover, a significant 
proportion of Russian investment is not recorded by established statistical channels. For 
example, transactions offshore are not registered as intra-regional investment (Kheyfets, 
2005). Thus, quantitative analysis of these data can be misleading. 
 All indices are calculated in two ways. The first measures integration between pairings 
of post-Soviet countries, i.e., it looks at all possible pairs of the twelve FSU countries and 
estimates the degree of market integration between them. The second looks at integration at 
the regional level: here, integration is calculated for five groups of countries in the post-Soviet 
space. The first group includes all twelve countries and is henceforth referred to as CIS-12 
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(although it is not entirely accurate, given Georgia’s decision to exit the CIS in 2009 and 
Turkmenistan’s “observer” status in this institution; however, we refer to the CIS as a region, 
not an organization). The second group comprises Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic and Tajikistan, thereby including all members of the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC-5). The third group includes the three largest economies of EurAsEC 
– Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (EurAsEC-3). The fourth group comprises the four largest 
CIS economies, i.e., the EurAsEC-3 countries and Ukraine. Given Ukraine’s reluctance to 
participate in any formal integration project in the CIS, the only example of an attempt at 
closer cooperation within this club was the unsuccessful Single Economic Space – hence, the 
group is referred to as SES-4. The final group includes four Central Asian countries 
(Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic) but not Turkmenistan, which has 
consistently avoided any involvement in cross-border cooperation since 1991. Hence, the five 
sub-regions used to make up the data cover almost all possible combinations of “regional 
cooperation” which have been discussed in the post-Soviet space during the last two decades.1  
 The SIEI data include another set of variables, which is relevant to our analysis, 
allowing us to examine the issue of economic convergence between countries, i.e. the 
potential shrinking (or widening) of the gap between the key indicators which characterize 
their economies and economic policies. The relevance of economic convergence in the 
context of this study is twofold. Firstly, extreme asymmetries between post-Soviet countries, 
as well as strong differences in their economic policies, have often been considered a force for 
disintegration in the region (Grinberg, 2004). Secondly, economic convergence can (under 
certain conditions) be driven by regional integration; so, we also have an opportunity to 
compare patterns of convergence with patterns of market integration, what can also be treated 
as an indirect measure of the success of market integration in the FSU. The SIEI dataset 
includes four indices for economic convergence, evaluating macroeconomic indicators, 
monetary, fiscal and financial policies.  
Once again, measures are calculated at the dyadic and at regional level. For the 
country pairings, the indicator is simply calculated as the Euclidian distance between two 
points (“countries”) in the multidimensional space, where each dimension represents a 
particular measure of economic activity (see Appendix, Table A2).  Specifically, assuming 
                                                     
1
 Two additional alternative groups could be considered if we were to include Southern Caucasus (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia) and the “Western flank” of the CIS (Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine); however, in both 
cases there is no evidence of attempts at closer cooperation – in the Caucasus it is prevented by conflict, and in 
the Western part of the CIS by strong political differences between two major players – Belarus and Ukraine. 
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that two countries A and B are characterized using two indicators each denoted as x1A and x2A 
and x1B and x2B respectively, the distance between these countries is obtained as: 
  
Both x1 and x2 are standardized (i.e. from the actual observations one subtracts the mean for 
the whole sample and divides by the standard deviation) in order to ensure compatibility of 
dimensions used, if they use different measurement units (as it is almost always the case). For 
the sub-regions the simple measure of sigma-convergence is calculated as average absolute 
value of the variation coefficients (standard deviation over mean) for all variables included in 
a particular measure. 
 
4. Regional-level analysis 
 As the starting point for our discussion, we consider integration and economic 
convergence at the regional level. Table 1 shows the dynamics of the SIEI’s five market 
integration indices for five post-Soviet regions. The results are straightforward: in three trade-
related indices (total trade, agricultural trade and trade in electricity) indicators for all five 
regions fall throughout the “growth decade” of 1999-2008. This would indicate that the 
disintegration trend initiated by the “Big Bang” in the 2000s is still continuing. However, this 
outcome does not reflect the overall “reduction” of intra-regional trade in absolute terms: 
rather that intra-regional transactions seem to increase at a slower rate than post-Soviet 
economies. Figure 1 below compares the dynamics of trade integration indices and total trade 
flow for the CIS-12 region in absolute terms. While total trade increased by more than 5 times 
between 1999 and 2000, the trade integration index decreased. As mentioned above, looking 
at both components of the index (using total trade or total GDP as a denominator) does not 
change the results. For trade in electricity (Figure 2), the results are less straightforward, since 
total trade has stagnated since the mid-2000s. Nevertheless, whilst trade in 2008 was almost 
the same as in 2002, the power utilities integration index fell dramatically.  Trade in 
agriculture (Figure 3) follows a similar path but, in this case, the correlation between the 
index and total trade is more pronounced (probably because the total trade value is more 
volatile). 
 
Figure 1, 2 and 3 about here 
 
Table 1 about here 
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 There are two possible reasons for this relative decline in internal economic activity. 
On the one hand, the results may simply reflect the re-orientation of trade towards non-post-
Soviet regions. This appears to be the case particularly for the “total trade” indicator, where 
the denominator is the trade turnover of the FSU countries. On the other hand, focusing on 
domestic development rather than on establishing cross-border links can also impair the 
growth of trade flows. This may be the case for trade in electricity. Currently, the post-Soviet 
space still has a significant shared technological infrastructure, which could potentially 
provide a foundation for a common electricity market. However, power utilities in the FSU 
countries are mostly controlled officially or unofficially by their governments, whose focus 
appears to be on reducing dependence upon potential foreign suppliers rather than benefitting 
from cross-border trade.  
  Central Asia provides us with a number of high-profile examples of such decisions. 
Over recent decades, Russia and Kazakhstan have efficiently managed extensive cross-border 
flows of electric power based on developed infrastructure and Kazakhstan’s comparative 
advantage as a provider of low-cost electric power produced from Ekibastuz coal. While 
Ekibastuz power was exported and consumed by neighbouring Russian regions just across the 
border, western parts of Kazakhstan were supplied with Russian energy. This situation was 
perceived as a threat by Kazakh authorities. It led to the construction of the 500km-long 
500kW “North Kazakhstan – Aktobe region” power line, which cost around USD180 mln to 
build in 2006-2007. Partly as a result of this, Kazakhstan’ s electric power imports from 
Russia fell from 5316 mln kW/h in 2004 to 2214 mln kW/h in 2008, while its exports to 
Russia remained virtually unchanged at 2379 mln kW/h, despite the vast export potential of 
Ekibastuz coal-fired power plants. This is four times lower than levels achieved in the 1980s 
(Vinokurov 2008).   
Uzbekistan represents another striking example of the prevalence of the narrowly 
defined ‘electric power security’ over an economically more beneficial regime of 
transboundary electricity flows within existing regional power systems. This country 
withdrew from the Unified Energy System of Central Asia (UES-CA) on December 1st, 2009. 
This unilateral act was apparently in the planning for two years, as the Uzbek power system 
was getting interconnected. Because of Uzbekistan’s central position, all Central Asian 
countries have been hit by this decision; Tajikistan, however, may be worst affected. For the 
last 70 years, Tajikistan has received a substantial proportion of its power supplies from 
neighboring Uzbekistan (its energy deficit in the fall-winter period constitutes around 2bn 
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kW/h; this is covered by 0.6bn kW/h of Uzbek energy and 1.2bn kW/h of Turkmen energy 
transited through Uzbekistan). Over the same period, Tajikistan has exported comparable 
amounts of electricity to Southern Uzbekistan in the spring-summer season, in the process of 
irrigating countries located downstream on major rivers. One of the solutions now being 
actively considered is to connect Khudzhand (Tajikistan), Datka (Kyrgyzstan) and Almaty 
(Kazakhstan) with a high-voltage power line, thus effectively bypassing Uzbekistan. This 
power line would, however, be longer than the existing one and require several years to build. 
Thus, Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the UES-CA has led to economically suboptimal 
production and the need for extensive capital investment. Uzbekistan will also be adversely 
hit by its own decision, as the country’s own power consumption peaks will no longer be 
covered by daily trans-border power flows within the regional unified system. In addition, 
effective international regulation of water in Central Asia has now become an even more 
remote prospect. 
 With regard to the integration of labor migration and education, the situation is 
reversed (see Table 1). We observe an immense increase of labor migration flows in the CIS-
12 and almost all other subregions (with the exception of CA-4, where data is available only 
for migration flows to Kazakhstan). It is worth noting that, in this case, the SIEI results 
provide a somewhat conservative estimate of migration flows, since a significant portion of 
labor migration is (semi-)illegal and hence not registered by any statistical authority. As for 
educational integration, the number of students studying abroad relative to total population 
also increased significantly after 2000 in all regions except CA-4.  Nevertheless, Central Asia 
is still the most “integrated” region in terms of student exchange (as well as in two other 
integration functions discussed so far, i.e. trade in grain and electricity). The growth of these 
indices suggests an even stronger growth of the total migration flows and flows of exchange 
students in the post-Soviet world.  
This result could be driven by several factors. To start with, it is possible that CIS 
integration in the factor markets (particularly, labor flows) is more successful than it has been 
for trade. This claim is indirectly supported by a large body of (largely anecdotal) evidence of 
increased outflow of Russian and Kazakhstani (also Ukrainian) capital from other CIS 
countries (Crane et al., 2005; RUSAL, 2006; Kuznetsov, 2008; Kheyfets and Libman, 2008; 
Skolkovo Business School, 2008).  This result is not only significant for post-Soviet 
countries, but also influences our understanding of regional integration processes in general, 
since factor flows are usually considered to occur at a more “advanced” stage of regional 
integration than trade relations (if one adopts the standard Balassa approach to this issue).  
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We might speculate that the relatively higher concentration of labor migration than of 
trade flows in the CIS is due to a combination of factors. To start with, labor migration is 
facilitated by the relatively unrestricted movement of post-Soviet citizens across borders 
(most of the countries operate a visa-free zone for such citizens) and weak employment 
legislation (including regulation of employment of foreigners). However, in such conditions it 
may be easier to control cross-border trade than labor migration – while the former is 
transacted across only a few border points, the latter takes place throughout the territory of the 
countries involved. Finally, the relatively large geographical dimensions of the post-Soviet 
space limit the relative scope of semi-legal and illegal transactions in border regions 
(although they may be large in absolute terms, their significance relative to the size of post-
Soviet economies in general may be smaller). It should be noted that informal border trade is 
still significant in individual sub-regions of the CIS, particularly Central Asia (see, for 
example, Byrd et al., 2006) and the Caucasus; some trade appears to take place even between 
countries engaged in hostilities, such as Armenia and Azerbaijan (Polyakov, 2001) or state-
controlled closed economies like Turkmenistan (Badykova, 2005). In several cases (i.e., 
disputed states such as Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia and Transdniestria, see Libman, 2008) the 
distinction between formal and informal trade is hard to apply. The conflict over milk exports 
between Russia and Belarus in 2009 illustrated clearly that, during the 1990s, suppliers from 
Belarus were able to dominate trade in several border regions of Russia (e.g., Briansk, cf. 
Dunaeva, 2009). However, the “correction” for unofficial trade in the CIS appears to be 
substantially smaller than for other groups of developing economies such as Africa (where 
there is a likely 40 pp difference between the official and the unofficial shares in intra-
regional trade, see Meagher, 1997). 
It is important to adopt a cautious approach to some interpretations of the differences 
between the integration of migration and trade. The results obtained could simply reflect 
discrepancies in the way the indices are constructed. While cross-border trade flows are 
evaluated in relation to the size of the economy (i.e., GDP), cross-border flows of labor 
migrants and students are evaluated relative to population size, which, unlike GDP, has 
remained virtually constant. A comparison of intra-regional labor migration with the outflow 
of migrants from the CIS to other regions of the world would generate less favorable results 
for labor market integration. This is particularly the case for countries such as Moldova, but 
may also be relevant for Ukraine. Similarly, the increase in cross-border student mobility in 
the FSU may, in spite of its apparent significance, be significantly outstripped by the outflow 
of students from the FSU to other countries. Unfortunately, the comparable data that are 
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available are not sufficient to allow a proper evaluation of this possibility; however, it should 
certainly be taken into account in order to arrive at a meaningful interpretation of outcomes. 
When evaluating economic convergence, it is more difficult to identify a general trend 
(see Table 2). With regard to macroeconomic convergence, which is probably the most useful 
indicator, an increasing divergence of the post-Soviet economies has been recorded, which is 
again present in all five sub-regions and has been strongest in Central Asia. However, 
indicators of convergence of financial and especially monetary policies show a clear trend 
towards a contraction of differences in the post-Soviet space. It has not been possible to draw 
conclusions regarding fiscal policy convergence because there are too many “gaps” in the 
data. Hence, where economic fundamentals are concerned, the development of post-Soviet 
countries is ambiguous, as are its potential consequences for the cross-border economic 
cooperation between governments. Divergence of macroeconomic variables may constitute a 
significant obstacle to this process because of increasing consensus-finding costs and 
problems of redistribution; the negative impact of economic asymmetry on cooperation 
potential is well documented in general articles (Mayer, 1981, Jensen, 1994, Fung and 
Schneider, 2005) and in literature relating specifically to the post-Soviet space (Libman, 
2009). This will, in turn, have an impact on the barriers to market integration. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
On the other hand, differences in monetary and banking policies between post-Soviet 
countries appear to be diminishing. It is, however, unlikely that this reduction is a 
consequence of market integration, a result, for example, of the development of an integrated 
market for financial services. Abalkina et al. (2010) indicate that although there is certain 
international expansion of Russian and Kazakh banks in the FSU, their impact on financial 
markets in the region’s countries is still relatively limited. The effect may be boosted by 
domestic factors: most countries in the region appear to have achieved at least some degree of 
financial stabilization (compared to the much larger discrepancies observed in the 1990s). 
However, at regional level, analysis suggests there are no differences in the 
development of each of five sub-regions – regardless of the indicator of market integration or 
economic convergence employed, and therefore it is difficult to analyze these processes 
separately. To make an attempt at this, we look at individual pairings of post-Soviet countries 
to try to find clusters of market integration and economic convergence. 
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5. Integration within individual dyads 
 In presenting the results for integration within country dyads, we have used the matrix 
of SIEI dyadic integration indices as a dissimilarity matrix for hierarchical cluster analysis 
(using Ward’s clustering).2 This allows us clearly to identify the countries that are more 
closely linked to one other in any particular type of regional integration and economic 
convergence. For the sake of simplicity, we have concentrated on a comparison of the clusters 
of macroeconomic convergence and integration of total trade and migration. The results of 
this cluster analysis are presented in the dendrograms in Figures 4-6 below. Firstly we look at 
trade integration clusters. As may be expected, all correspond to the geographical sub-regions 
of the FSU. One cluster is formed by the Southern Caucasian countries, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia (Armenia is linked to this group via Georgia, since no direct trade between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan is officially reported). Another cluster is formed by three Slavic FSU 
countries (Russia, Belarus and Ukraine) and another by three Central Asian countries 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan (no data is available for Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan). The only exception is Moldova, which is linked to Central Asia rather than 
Ukraine (although the Ukraine-Moldova dyad still displays relatively strong integration). 
With regard to migration integration, the tightest cluster identified was the pairing of 
Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. This is certainly due to the cultural similarities between 
these two countries, which, supported by economic growth in Kazakhstan, encouraged 
migration in the region (Schmitz, 2009). Other clusters do not seem to be particularly 
pronounced. 
 
Figures 4-6 about here 
 
 If we examine clusters of macroeconomic convergence, we find a completely different 
picture. In this field, we identified three main clusters. The first comprises Belarus, 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Although the first two of these countries are similar in terms of 
the very slow progress of their economic reform, Azerbaijan has a unique position in the post-
                                                     
2
 For the economic convergence, we take four original matrices of indicators as dissimilarity matrices. For 
market integration we transform the matrices to obtain dissimilarity matrices (i.e. matrices where higher value of 
an entry represents higher distance between observations) by multiplying all entries by (-1) and adding a positive 
number to obtain positive entry (specifically, 10 for trade, 0.1 for migration, 3 for agriculture, 360 for power 
utilities and 260 for education – since the size of the values of indicators is different in each case). Therefore the 
size of the dissimilarity is not comparable over different matrices (although the relative degree of similarity 
between individual countries can be compared). Some observations with absent data (mostly Turkmenistan) are 
dropped from some matrices. 
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Soviet space due to the strong growth this country saw in the mid-2000s following completion 
of several large oil pipeline projects. The second group comprises three large countries –
Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine – all of which are much further along the road of economic 
reform. Kazakhstan is the country that is most similar to Russia. Georgia also forms part of 
this grouping, probably because its process of economic reform is also relatively advanced. 
The third group comprises other smaller economies of the CIS, (Georgia being the only 
exception) and Uzbekistan. While some sub-clusters in this group (e.g., the Kyrgyz Republic 
and Tajikistan) fit the pattern of geographical proximity, others do not. So, while the main 
driving force for trade and to a lesser extent migration seems to be geographical 
configuration, the more significant determinants of macroeconomic clusters are speed of 
reform and size of economy.  
 To conclude, market integration clusters do not appear to coincide with clusters of 
economic convergence, and therefore a causal link (either way) between these two 
phenomena in the FSU space seems unlikely. Similar results were obtained for other 
indicators of integration and convergence (as shown in Appendix B), although in these cases 
factors supporting convergence and integration seem to be different. For power utilities and 
education, the stronger clusters are once again geographical and located in Central Asia 
(Tajikistan – Uzbekistan and Uzbekistan – Kyrgyz Republic), because of greater 
interdependency on electricity and water resources and the position of the Kyrgyz Republic as 
a regional educational center. In agriculture, one of the most pronounced clusters (Belarus – 
Ukraine) is geographical. For the other cluster (Azerbaijan – Kazakhstan) the determining 
factor is the use by Kazakh investors of Azerbaijan’s port and railway facilities for grain 
export.  For the policy convergence clusters geography does not seem to have any 
significance.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 The aim of this paper was to provide a quantitative assessment of regional integration 
among the FSU countries during the “growth decade” starting in 1999. Our particular focus 
was the expansion of trade and migration between countries rather than the establishment of 
formal integration initiatives. While the contraction of intra-regional trade in the 1990s was 
clearly apparent (though smaller than expected), during the 2000s, when the “Big Bang” 
effect of the USSR’s disintegration had diminished, the results were less easy to interpret.  
Using the new EDB System of Indicators of Eurasian Integration data, we came to 
four main conclusions. Firstly, in the trade sphere (including areas such as agriculture and 
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electricity) the post-Soviet world continued its trend towards disintegration. This was also 
true for particular FSU sub-regions, both geographical (e.g., Central Asia) and based on 
different regional integration projects (EurAsEC-3, EurAsEC-5). Our next conclusion, 
however, was that, over the same period, the degree of integration of migration and 
educational mobility in the post-Soviet space increased significantly. It is important to 
understand that the decline of integration indices for trade is relative: it indicates that the 
intensification of intra-regional linking was slower than the growth of national economies and 
of their extra-regional economic ties. Thirdly, we discovered varying evidence of economic 
convergence: while post-Soviet countries seem to diverge when it comes to economic growth, 
the trend is the reverse for monetary and financial activity. Finally, we examined convergence 
and integration at the dyadic level. We found that “integration club” and “convergence club” 
clusters do not coincide, and therefore there is no direct link between these two processes. 
While “integration clubs” seem to depend mostly on geography, for “convergence clubs” 
factors such as domestic economic policy, institutional environment and size of economy are 
more significant. 
From this point of view, several more general conclusions are possible. To start with, 
the FSU provides us with interesting evidence that the more advanced “factor flow” 
integration can be more successful than traditional “first stage” trade integration, even in spite 
of extremely weak formal regionalism structures. Certainly, the result is related to the nexus 
of integration and disintegration processes described in the introduction: the increase of labor 
migration benefits a lot from traditional links between the FSU countries. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that in regions with established ties at the microlevel a good starting point for the 
regionalism debate is to encourage cooperation regarding cross-border factor flows, 
postponing the discussion of a free trade area or a customs union. Second, the results of the 
study show that economic convergence and regional integration can exhibit very different 
spatial patterns. While for “integration clubs” one could expect stronger “demand” for 
regional initiatives from the private sector, in the “convergence clubs” policy coordination is 
more likely because of the similarity of shocks and reaction to them. However, if these clubs 
do not coincide, the trade-off between economic benefits from the larger markets and political 
risks from the inability of country-specific reaction to shocks (Alesina and Perotti 1998) for 
the regionalism projects can become even more acute and difficult to solve. 
This study acknowledges its limitations. We were forced to exclude data on FDI and 
capital movement because of the extreme incompatibility of national statistical data. We were 
thus unable to analyze a potentially significant element of market integration. Secondly, the 
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SIEI is still based primarily on official statistical data, which may in fact underestimate 
economic links (for example, by ignoring unofficial cross-border trade) and convergence (by 
ignoring the grey economy as a component of economic growth). Nevertheless, we believe 
that this study provides insights in the process of regional integration in the FSU during the 
recent period of economic growth. In 2008, expansion was crushed by the emerging economic 
crisis, which has affected almost all post-Soviet countries and the economic links between 
them. Other market integration trends in the FSU are yet to be studied. 
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Table 1: Integration of markets in five regions of the post-Soviet space 
 
Indicators and regions 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Trade            
CIS-12 0.21412 0.224097 0.213522 0.195411 0.201085 0.202334 0.174044 0.16899 0.172291 0.163872 
EurAsEC-5 0.126179 0.134602 0.127207 0.116401 0.118982 0.123763 0.09582 0.095321 0.098051 0.094374 
EurAsEC-3 0.120965 0.129563 0.12354 0.112848 0.11496 0.119421 0.09163 0.090835 0.092604 0.088898 
SES-4 0.195221 0.197931 0.187011 0.16857 0.174898 0.181135 0.151745 0.146596 0.148378 0.144569 
CA-4 0.059471 0.0449 0.042387 0.037666 0.03694 0.036924 0.030663 0.027812 0.034646 0.030163 
Migration            
CIS-12 NA 0.396614 0.54904 0.754337 0.666859 0.821987 1.266581 1.976516 4.189221 6.451831 
EurAsEC-5 NA 0.020486 0.025232 0.145761 0.028547 0.029931 0.031373 0.037066 0.052817 0.075533 
EurAsEC-3 NA 0.058256 0.088545 0.265241 0.129144 0.21363 0.423831 0.791915 2.068706 3.290513 
SES-4 NA 0.317979 0.449617 0.403983 0.508032 0.536851 0.696712 0.843425 1.038315 1.228716 
CA-4 NA 0.002011 0.001642 0.002112 0.002918 0.042616 0.048282 0.085065 0.059274 0.052034 
Power utilities            
CIS-12 NA NA NA 50.5994 46.67956 36.7153 28.96486 20.79685 15.02533 10.14866 
EurAsEC-5 NA NA NA 26.87286 25.80586 20.4479 15.62039 9.537353 6.8638 4.018138 
EurAsEC-3 NA NA NA 25.08239 19.96777 13.84555 11.31111 7.280713 5.794442 3.628337 
SES-4 NA NA NA 23.13403 18.48647 12.98607 13.3116 9.104473 6.336079 3.850577 
CA-4 NA NA NA 256.8841 241.2182 192.5408 147.6785 107.5481 78.92387 51.65543 
Education            
CIS-12 NA 160.3218 224.5606 201.6453 233.1012 282.0446 306.9638 354.6405 364.7804 380.9233 
EurAsEC-5 NA 137.5584 186.5123 160.3978 186.4389 200.4654 200.0706 229.7344 263.4358 272.0108 
EurAsEC-3 NA 134.2881 148.8705 133.1075 159.2035 166.7507 166.2632 185.4927 218.8083 228.8707 
SES-4 NA 127.7392 141.7435 125.917 148.7511 172.4759 175.9648 197.6943 222.9746 238.2815 
CA-4 NA 70.59838 287.3453 272.7285 347.026 449.5387 521.7593 563.2523 496.3772 391.0104 
Agriculture            
CIS-12 NA NA NA 6.432883 9.592314 6.748042 3.466841 3.892393 2.865693 2.030176 
EurAsEC-5 NA NA NA 3.27852 2.770186 2.956347 1.256028 1.958551 1.077532 0.577149 
EurAsEC-3 NA NA NA 2.107545 2.288755 2.735074 0.854466 1.552797 0.641843 0.269414 
SES-4 NA NA NA 2.80742 7.412691 4.20831 1.328058 1.896875 0.763772 0.539101 
CA-4 NA NA NA 16.33501 5.632302 4.225324 6.703841 6.183241 6.019463 4.512677 
 
Note: higher value of the indicator represents higher level of integration. The details on the 
calculations are reported in Appendix A, Table A1 
 
Source: SIEI 
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Table 2: Economic convergence in five regions of the post-Soviet space 
 
Indicators and regions 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Macroeconomic           
CIS-12 0.29797 0.327842 0.350826 0.366306 0.377869 0.393347 0.41504 0.431253 0.41189 0.418903 
EurAsEC-5 0.345427 0.385849 0.401057 0.406214 0.397005 0.411752 0.431557 0.437204 0.429365 0.450715 
EurAsEC-3 0.048564 0.150702 0.159527 0.143877 0.140012 0.156096 0.148552 0.155882 0.162875 0.194617 
SES-4 0.155496 0.210504 0.21323 0.20382 0.206397 0.222834 0.222071 0.224163 0.223741 0.24389 
CA-4 0.393655 0.442486 0.512494 0.55822 0.572445 0.60755 0.662566 0.700274 0.683769 0.711466 
Monetary policy           
CIS-12 0.430089 0.311984 0.171127 0.184729 0.062619 0.044082 0.042431 0.044743 0.05357 0.058453 
EurAsEC-5 0.374113 0.419254 0.173622 0.110258 0.083296 0.04802 0.029386 0.034164 0.044901 0.02327 
EurAsC-3 0.375763 0.598084 0.211224 0.117298 0.086702 0.056232 0.015303 0.022471 0.037173 0.015765 
SES-4 0.409141 0.483292 0.200656 0.126574 0.076437 0.046814 0.015577 0.021604 0.033509 0.039534 
CA-4 0.075476 0.179956 0.1837 0.247707 0.066329 0.027762 0.033715 0.053944 0.05728 0.049495 
Financial policy           
CIS-12 0.352851 0.333316 0.324175 0.322493 0.309053 0.332133 0.315131 0.349454 0.315807 0.292829 
EurAsEC-5 0.349203 0.456407 0.480999 0.454449 0.44493 0.468835 0.467437 0.430808 0.345657 0.308535 
EurAsEC-3 0.34678 0.378685 0.430648 0.422375 0.428788 0.394348 0.302502 0.203954 0.144281 0.15884 
SES-4 0.419621 0.415221 0.403838 0.378595 0.348461 0.317324 0.275899 0.188536 0.131804 0.161529 
CA-4 0.394335 0.261071 0.103928 0.474565 0.521081 0.541993 0.549751 0.491898 0.41923 0.37615 
Fiscal policy           
CIS-12 NA 1.513864 2.053581 1.757057 1.671758 3.078558 2.309815 1.806819 1.681661 1.858032 
EurAsEC-5 NA 2.114481 2.322771 5.703069 2.272686 2.209893 1.448267 1.355333 1.181072 1.107399 
EurAsEC-3 NA 1.578893 2.585471 1.777911 1.547782 1.339206 1.111545 1.044591 1.088539 1.046757 
SES-4 NA 1.266601 3.75359 1.248691 1.537721 5.640871 1.441183 1.227702 1.257041 1.190195 
CA-4 NA 0.847233 1.564097 0.981815 0.985047 0.716869 1.467299 2.171179 0.996254 0.889845 
 
Note: lower level of indicator represents higher level of convergence (“smaller distance”). 
The details on the calculations are reported in Appendix A, Table A2, and in Section 3 of 
the paper 
 
Source: SIEI 
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Figure 1: Trade integration index and total trade (right scale, sum of exports and imports of all 
countries of CIS-12 from this region, mln. USD) 
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Figure 2: Power utilities integration index and total trade in electricity (right scale, mln kWh) 
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Figure 3: Agricultural integration index and total trade in grain (right scale, ‘000 tons) 
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Figure 4: Clusters of trade integration, 2008 
 
Note: AZ= Azerbaijan, GEOR=Georgia, ARM=Armenia, KAZ = Kazakhstan, KYRG = 
Kyrgyz Rep., TAJ = Tajikistan, MOLD = Moldova, BEL = Belarus, RUS = Russia, UKR = 
Ukraine 
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Figure 5: Clusters of labor migration, 2008 
 
Note: see Figure 4. TURK = Turkmenistan, UZB = Uzbekistan 
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Figure 6: Clusters of macroeconomic convergence, 2008 
 
See Figure 5 
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Appendix A1: Components of indicators 
Table A1: Indicators of market integration 
 
Indicator Dyad Region 
Total trade (Country’s share in the total foreign 
trade turnover of the country pair + 
country’s share in the total GDP of 
the country pair) *100 / 2 
(Share of the countries’ mutual trade in 
their total foreign trade turnover + share 
of the countries’ mutual trade in the 
region’s total GDP) *100 / 2 
Migration Labour migrants from each country 
of the pair working in the other 
country (thousand people) / total 
population of the country pair 
(million people) 
Labour migrants from all countries of 
the region working in other the 
countries of the region (thousand 
people)/ total population of the region 
(million people) 
Electric 
power 
Volume of trade in electric power 
between the countries of the pair 
(thousands kW/h) / their total GDP 
GDP (million USD) 
Volume of trade in electric power 
between the countries of the region 
(thousands kW/h) / the region’s GDP 
GDP (million USD) 
Agriculture Volume of trade in cereals between 
the countries of the pair (tonnes) / 
their total GDP (million USD) 
Volume of trade in cereals between the 
countries of the region (tonnes) / the 
region’s GDP (million USD) 
Education Number of students from each 
country of the pair studying in the 
other country (person) / total 
population of the country pair 
(million people) 
Number of students from all countries 
of the region studying in other the 
countries of the region (person) / total 
population of the region (million 
people) 
Note: The trade integration index is divided by 100 for convenience in presenting data and to 
ensure compatibility with the standard “share in foreign trade” indices, which are expressed as 
percentages  
 
Table A2: Variables in the convergence indicators 
 
Indicator Variables 
Macroeconomic 
indicators 
GDP per capita (USD); annual GDP growth rates (%) 
Monetary 
policy 
average interest rate for deposits (%); average lending interest rate (%) 
Fiscal policy share of consolidated public budget expenditures in the GDP, (%) share of 
external debt in the GDP (%), share of consolidated budget surplus in the 
GDP (%), ratio of share of tax revenue in the GDP (%) and the GDP per 
capita (USD) (Frank index of the tax load on the economy) 
Financial policy annual growth rates of national currency exchange rate to the USD, annual 
inflation rate (%) 
Note: all variables are standardized using the standard normal distribution for comparability 
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Appendix B: Clusters of integration of markets and economic convergence 
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Monetary policy convergence
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Financial policy convergence
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Fiscal policy convergence
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Power utilities
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Figure B1: Clusters of economic policy convergence (financial, fiscal and monetary policy) and of trade in selected areas (power utilities, 
agriculture, education), 2008 
Note: see Figure 5 
